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The  paper  focuses  on  the  proximate  causes  of  the  Finnish  savings  and 
cooperative  banks'  non-performing  assets  in  the  current  banking  crisis. 
Specifically, the  effects  of the  lending structure at  the  outset of the  crisis  and 
the rate of growth of lending in the latter half of the 1980s are investigated. 
The  main  findings  are:  (1)  Lending  structure  alone  is  not  sufficient  to 
explain  the  variation  in  the  share  of non-performing  assets  among  the  local 
banks.  (2)  Growth  of lending  is  a  major  explanatory  factor:  the  faster  the 
growth  in  the  second  half  of the  1980s,  the  higher  the  later  share  of non-
performing assets.  (3) Growth of lending is  a particularly  important  "cause"  in 
the case of the  savings banks,  where  lending structure does  not seem  to  have 
had  much  of an  impact.  (4)  Lending to  manufacturing,  construction  and  trade 
has  had  a significant negative effect on the cooperative banks' asset quality.  (5) 
Differences in the rate of lending growth go a long way in explaining why  there 
are on average much more problem loans  in  the savings bank group than in  the 
cooperative  bank  group.  (6)  The  share  of foreign  currency  loans  is  not  an 
important factor when the effect of growth is  accounted  for,  although the roles 
cannot be fully  separated due to  multicollinearity.  (7)  Assuming that growth of 
lending  is  more  under the  control of a  bank than  the  structure of lending,  the 
findings  support  the  view  that  "bad  luck"  is  not  the  only  explanation  of the 
Finnish banking problems but "bad banking"  in the form  of either ignorance of 
risks or deliberate risk taking is  a major factor as well. 
Tiivistelma 
Keskustelualoitteessa tarkastellaan suomalaisten saasto- ja osuuspankkien jaIjes-
tamattomien  luottojen  valittomia  syita  nykyisessa  pankkikriisissa.  Mielenkiinto 
kohdistuu ennen kaikkea luotonannon rakenteen ja 1980-luvun lopun luottoeks-
pans ion vaikutuksiin. 
Paatulokset ovat: (1) JaIjestamattomien luottojen osuudessa pankkien valilla 
havaittavaa  vaihteluaei ole  selitettavissa  yksin  pankkien  luottojen  rakenteella. 
(2)  Luottojen kasvuvauhti on keskeinen  selittava tekija:  mitti  nopeampaa kasvu 
1980-luvun  jalkipuoliskolla,  sita  suurempi  jarjestamattomien  luottojen  osuus 
myohemmin.  (3)  Luottojen  kasvuvauhti  on  erityisen  tarkea  tekija  saastopank-
kien osalta, joiden jarjestamattamien maaraan luotonannon rakenteella  ei  nayta 
oUeen  merkittavaa  vaikutusta.  (4)  Luotonanto  teollisuuteen,  rakennustoimintaan 
ja kauppaan  on  lisannyt selvasti jarjestamattomien osuutta  osuuspankeissa.  (5) 
Erot luotonannon kasvuvauhdissa selittavat pitkalle, miksi saastopankeilla keski-
maarin on tuntuvasti enemman ongelmaluottoja kuin osuuspankeilla. (6) Valuut-
taluottojen  osuus  ei  ole  merkittava  tekija,  kun  kasvun  vaikutus  otetaan  huo-
mioon,  mutta  naiden  tekijoiden  keskinaisen  riippuvuuden  takia  vaikutuksia  ei 
voida Uiysin  erottaa.  (7) Olettaen etta luotonannon kasvuvauhti on suuremmassa 
maarin  pankkien  paatettavissa  kuin  luotonannon rakenne  tulokset tukevat kasi-
tysta,  ettei  "huono onni"  ole riittava selitys Suomen pankkiongelmille vaan eWi 
myos  joko ymmartamattomyyteen  tai  tietoiseen riskinottoon  perustunut  "huono 
pankkitoiminta" on keskeinen tekija. 
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5 1  Introduction 
In countries having experienced serious banking problems in  the recent years  it 
has  become commonplace to  classify the  causes of the banks'  losses  into  three 
main categories: bad banking, bad policies and  bad  luck. The bad  luck (and bad 
policies) story  essentially says that the banking sector has  been hit by  external 
shocks, for which the bankers really could not have prepared. 
Thus given that the Finnish economy slid into  a very severe recession with 
especially  domestic  demand  decreasing  steeply,  all  banks  having  significant 
exposure  to  the  firm  sector  operating  in  the  domestic  markets  (basically  all 
major  Finnish  banks)  unavoidably  saw  their  assets  deteriorate.1  And,  as  some 
banks  were  more  exposed  than  others  to  the  closed  sector,  it  should  be  no 
surprise that the banks' relative performances have varied substantially. 
Given the banks' traditional specializations and  the importance of customer 
relationships,  one may  furthermore  argue  that  the  portfolio  structures  are  to  a 
significant  extent exogenous  to  the  banks  even  in  a  couple of years'  horizon. 
Consequently,  the fact  that  some banks  incurred more  losses than others  could 
be  interpreted  as  reflecting more bad  luck than  ignorance of risk  or deliberate 
risk taking. 
However,  the  speed  at  which  credit  is  expanded  is  probably  more 
controllable by  the banks,  even in  the short run.  And what might be called  the 
"reckless  lending"  story  suggests  that  rapid  expansion  of credit  was  a  major 
factor  leading  to  vulnerable  portfolios  both  at  the  aggregate  level  and  at  the 
bank level.  2 
That growth of lending is  associated with later banking problems is  clear at 
the aggregate level. Basically in  all  countries with serious banking problems  in 
the  recent  past  - Norway,  Sweden,  Finland,  Japan,  parts  of the  US,  and  in  a 
lesser  degree  the  UK  and  France),  credit  expansion  was  very  rapid  in  the 
second half of last decade. 
But this  aggregate  level  correlation  may  just indicate that  households  and 
firms  borrowed  heavily  from  whatever  sources  in  the  boom  period,  and  the 
following strong increase in problem assets was a result of a general collapse of 
demand  and  asset values.  No  linkage  is  necessarily  implied  at  the bank  level 
between the speed of credit extension and the later amount of problem assets. 
Some observations suggest,  nevertheless,  that there indeed is  a relationship 
between growth and  problem assets also at the bank level. In Finland, it was the 
savings  banks  and  the  commercial  bank  owned  by  savings  banks,  Skopbank, 
which  as  a group  both  increased  credit fastest  and  later ended  up  in  the  most 
serious  asset  quality  problems  (Figure  1).  Studies  on  banking problems  in  the 
1  The  evolution of the  Finnish banking crisis  has  been described by  ego  Nyberg and  VihriaHi. 
(1994), and Koskenkyla and  Vesala (1994). Koskenkyla (1994) compares  the banking problems 
of different Nordic countries. 
2 "Overextension" of credit has been considered a major factor in the makings of financial crises 
particularly by Minsky (eg. 1977) and Kindleberger (eg. 1982). With reference to recent UK and 
Nordic experiences growth of lending has been taken up  as a factor contributing to  the  fate  of 
financial institutions ego  by Pettersson (1993) and  Benink and Llewellyn (1994). Randall  (1993) 
discusses the issue in the context of American banking problems. 
7 serious  asset quality problems.  Studies on  banking problems in  the  US  suggest· 
also that lending growth is among the major determinants of bank failures. 
Figure 1.  Growth of lending and non-performing assets 
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1) Non-performing  assets  on 31.8.1994  plus  credit  losses  1.1.1991 
through  31.8.1994  of  bank  groups  (including  daughter  credit 
institutions) per cent of lending outstanding on 31.12.1990. 
2) Growth  of  lending  of  bank  groups  (including  daughter  credit 
institutions) between 31.12.1986 and 31.12,1990. 
3) Including Okobank 
4)  Including Skopbank and Arsenal Ltd. 
In  this  paper,  we  investigate  the  importance  of lending growth  as  opposed  to 
asset structure as  a factor  determining the share of problem  assets  at  the bank 
level. We use cross-section data on Finnish savings and cooperative banks. The 
relatively  large  number of observations  (85  savings  banks  and  316 cooperative 
banks in the data set) should allow discriminating between the hypotheses much 
better  than  looking  just  at  a  few  commercial  banks  and  the  local  banks  as 
groups. 
2  Formulation of the problem 
Assume  that  the  probability  of a  markka  of lending  to  turn  lIbad  11  ie.  non-
performing at a later stage is  Pi for sector i (eg.  real estate). Assume further that 
this  probability  can be  presented  as  a sum  of a truly  sector specific  factor  Pi 
common for  all  banks,  and  bank specific factor  pO  + Lpkxk(n),  common  for  all 
sectors. The bank specific factor is  thus  assumed  to  be a linear function of bank 
dependent variables xk(n). Then, for  bank n,  the expectation of the share of non-
performing assets ("NPA") in all  assets  "A"  ("NP ASH") is  simply 
8 I  I 
LNP Ai(n)  LP iAln) 
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(1) 
Our  exercise  is  basically  to  estimate  the  Pi  (i =  1, ...  ,1)  and  pk  (k =  0,  ... K) 
parameters of this equation. The Pi'S  are the coefficients of sectoral asset shares, 
while the pbS  are the coefficients of bank specific variables such as  the rate of 
growth of lending. 
It would, of course, be more informative to analyze bank dependent factors 
within every  sector.  However,  this  is  excluded,  as  there are  no  comprehensive 
data available on  the  break-down of non-performing assets  by  sectors.  Data on 
non-performing assets  and  credit write-offs  by sector have  been collected  only 
for  commercial  banks  and  a  sample  of cooperative  and  savings  banks.  Those 
data are displayed in the appendix. 
Nevertheless, the availability  of information on the sectoral break-down of 
non-performing  assets  at  the  aggregate  level  gives  us  an  aggregate  level 
probability  p1GG  of  non-performing  assets  in  every  sector  i.  Using  these 
probabilities  together  with  bank  specific  asset  shares  A;(n)/A(n)  allows  us  to 
compute the  prediction  for  the share of non-performing  assets  for  every  bank 
under the assumption that banks differ only with regard to  asset structures. The 
predicted share NP ASHE(n) is: 
I  A(n) 
NPASHE(n) = LpfGG_i  _ 
i=l  A(n) 
(2) 
We thus  have two  ways  of modelling  the  dependence of the  npa  share of the 
bank's asset structure: (i)  as  in  the above equation (1) by  including the sectoral 
asset  shares  in  the  equation  and  estimating  the  individual  coefficients 
("probabilities") or (ii) by  including the prediction of the npa share in the above 
equation instead of the asset shares and estimating its coefficient a: 
K 
NPASH(n) =aNPASHE(n) +po + Lpkxk(n) 
k=l 
(3) 
These two  approaches  differ  in  the  sense that the  prediction version  limits  the 
influence of a given asset share strictly  to  translating a universal sector-specific 
probability  into  a  contribution  of  that  sectors'  assets  to  the  bank's  non-
performing assets as  a whole. In the former version any asset share variable can 
also function as  a proxy for  some other factor.  Thus a share of some asset may 
9 correlate strongly with the overall npa share even if the share is  as such far too 
small to generate much npa's. 
In addition to the sector specific variable(s) the equation includes variables 
that reflect credit risk  associated with  all  lending of a given bank in  the same 
proportion.  Should  the  "bad-luck"  story  be  the  whole  truth,  only  the  sectoral 
asset  share  variables  or  the  predicted  npa  share  should  obtain  a  coefficient 
significantly  different  from  zero.  In  the  prediction  version,  the  bad-luck  case 
would  additionally  imply  that the coefficient of the  predicted npa  share should 
be unity. 
If, on  the  other  hand,  the  bank  characteristics  have  significantly  affected 
asset  quality,  also  the  bank  dependent  variables  should  obtain  significant 
coefficients.  As  noted  earlier,  the  "reckless  lending"  view  suggests  a  prime 
candidate in the latter group of variables: the rate of growth of bank lending (or 
preferably total credit risk exposure) as  a whole. 
There are  several  reasons  why  rapid  credit expansion could  be  associated 
with a deterioration of asset quality. First, rapid growth could be an objective of 
a bank to  the  extent that  creditworthiness  could  be disregarded  as  a factor  by 
the  loan  officers.  Second,  rapid  growth  could  simply  overwhelm  a  bank's 
resources  for  risk  analysis  so  that  assessment  of  credit  quality  becomes 
indequate.  Third,  more  fundamentally,  adverse  selection  could  be  a  major 
phenomenon when a bank attracts customers that earlier have been rationed out 
completely  or  are  served  by  other  banks.  The  current  lender  is  likely  to 
"release"  only  customers  whose  creditworthiness  is  questionable,  which  may 
largely  be  private information.  Fourth,  growth  could  be  a deliberate  means  of 
assuming risks in a "gamble for resurrection". 
Apart from  the overall  growth of lending,  also  other bank specific factors 
could  affect  asset  quality.  Assuming  that  adverse  selection  problems  are  more 
serious when a bank expands lending to sectors where the bank has  little earlier 
expertise,  one  would  expect  the  credit  risk  of the  portfolio  to  be  positively 
associated with the degree of change in the asset structure in the period of rapid 
credit extension. 
On the other hand,  the  diversity of asset portfolio should  as  such diminish 
overall  credit risk,  provided  that  the  shocks  to  individual  sectors  are  less  than 
fully correlated. 
Asset  quality  could  also  be  affected  by  bank size.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
larger  the  bank  the  better  it  probably  is  diversified.  A  bigger  bank  may  also 
have  more  specialized  resources  to  assess  the  clients'  creditworthiness  and 
monitor their behaviour. These factors work to  improve asset quality. 
However,  the  management  of a  large  savings  or  cooperative  bank  could 
behave in a less risk averse manner than that of a small bank. This could be the 
case for at  least two  reasons.  First, the consequences of a failure could be more 
severe  for  a  small  bank  than  a  big  one.  Bankruptcy  is  a  much  more  likely 
outcome for  small  banks  than  bigger  banks  (which  may  be  "too  big  to  fail"). 
Moreover, even without bankruptcy a small bank could easily disappear through 
merger while a bigger bank might be rescued  as  an independent entity. 
Secondly,  there  is  no  effective  owner  control  in  the  savings  banks  and 
cooperative banks. There are  no true owners at all  in the first case and  the stake 
of an  individual  member  of a  cooperative  is  miniscule.  The  management  has 
from  this  point of view substantial freedom  of action.  In small local  banks  the 
management might,  however,  be discouraged  from  using this  freedom  for  risk 
10 taking. The standing in  the  local community and  the future job opportunities of 
the manager of a small local bank could be seriously jeopardised by bad results 
while  the  reward  in  the  case of favourable  realisations  might be modest.  This 
suggests that small banks might be less prone to  take risk in relative terms than 
large banks. 
Finally,  in  the  period  of our  analysis,  the  extent  to  which  a  bank  has 
intermediated foreign  currency  loans  can  be  assumed  to  have had  a significant 
impact  on  a  bank's  credit risk.  Local  banks  namely  supplied  credit  mainly  to 
the  domestic sectors  of the  economy  implying  that the  firms'  debts  in  foreign 
currency  were  not  normally  hedged  against  the  substantial  depreciation of the 
markka between November 1991  and  the Spring of 1993.  We thus  include the 
share of foreign currency loans in all  loans as  an explanatory variable. 
Some care  should  be  exercised  when  interpreting  the  results  that  can  be 
obtained  from  estimating  the  sort  of equation  that  we  have  postulated.  The 
analysis is· about  the  proximate causes  of problem  assets:  lending structure and 
lending  growth.  Both  of them  are  choice  variables  for  the  banks.  It is  only 
under the assumption that structure is  more predetermined than lending growth 
that  one  can  make  inference  about  the  relative  merits  of  "bad  luck"  and 
"reckless lending" or "bad banking" stories. 
And even if the structure is  not predetermined, there could be bad  luck. An 
example:  The  banks  were  certainly  able  to  choose  whether  or  not  to  supply 
loans  denominated  in  foreign  currencies  in  the  late  1980s.  Nevertheless,  a 
strong effect of this  variable could still be consistent with the  "bad  luck"  story: 
the  depreciation  of the  markka  could  be  considered  legitimately  a  bad  luck 
phenomenon,  given  the  consistently  articulated  and  successful  policy  of no 
devaluations since 1982. 
More  generally,  our  analysis  does  not  as  such  provide  any  explanations 
why  certain banks  might have chosen a given pace of credit growth or a given 
asset  structure.  For  example,  the  factors  discussed  above  that  might  be 
associated  with  bank  size  may  affect  asset  quality  more  through  growth  and 
asset structure (as measured by us) than directly, which is what we test. 
3  The data and some preliminary observations 
The portfolios with which the  Finnish banks  entered the recession were created 
essentially  in  the  years  of very  rapid  credit  expansion  1987  through  1989.  In 
1990 the growth  of assets  was  already  very  small.  The recession really started 
in  1991.  In  the  early  phases  of the  crisis  the  banks'  write-offs  were  rather 
conservative.  Furthermore,  all  banks  did  not  compile  systematic  statistics  on 
non-performing assets  in  this  stage.  Only  in  1992 all  banks  started  to  produce 
statistics on  non-performing  assets  in  a consistent manner.3  1992 was  also  the 
first year when banks wrote off significant parts  of their non-performing assets 
(and of so-called soft loans). 
3  According  to  the  regulation of the  Bank SuperviSion  Office  (now  Financial  Supervision),  a 
claim on a customer is  to  be classified as  non-performing,  if interest or principal payments are 
in arrears for at least three months. 
11 In 1992  and  1993  the  savings  bank  group  underwent  a  very  significant 
restructuring.  First,  in  1992  43  savings  banks  were  merged  into  the  Savings 
Bank of Finland (SBF), implying a disappearance of roughly half of the units in 
the group.  In 1993  the  good  assets  of SBF were sold  to  four competitors,  and 
the  non-performing  assets  were  transferred  to  an  asset  management  company 
(Arsenal Ltd.) owned by the State. 
These  changes  imply  that  the  evolution  of  asset  quality  in  the  very 
interesting savings  bank group  is  difficult  to  follow  in  the  most recent  period. 
Because of these difficulties,  we have used  April  1993 as  a cut-off date in  the 
sense that we  have constructed  the  non-performing asset variable (NP A)  to  be 
used in the analysis as  the sum of non-performing loans (net of credit losses) at 
the end of April 1993 and  the credit losses booked by the bank in the course of 
1992 and  the four first months  of 1993. Not taking into account the assets that 
have turned  non-performing  later should  not distort  the  analysis  too  much,  as 
the growth on non-performing assets decelerated rapidly through 1993. 
The  non-performing  assets  due  to  guarantee  obligations  are  excluded,  as 
data  on  corresponding  liabilities  are  not  readily  available.  In  principle,  this 
should not  pose  a big problem for  the analysis either,  as  normally  there should 
not  be  good  grounds  to  believe  that  credit  risks  would  have  differed 
significantly  between  these  two  types  of claims.  A caveat  nevertheless  is  that 
guarantees  may  have  been  given  disproportionally  to  foreign  currency  loans 
provided  to  the  customers  by  the  central  banks  of the  savings  banks  and  the 
cooperative  banks  (Skopbank  and  Okobank,  respectively).  If foreign  currency 
loans  have turned  out to  be  more risky  than other loans,  omitting the problem 
assets stemming from this source distorts the results. 
Thus  we use the  ratio  of (gross)  non -performing loans  in  April  1993 over 
the stock of loans  at  the  end  of 1990 as  the problem asset variable (dependent 
variable  in  regressions);  the  variable  name  is  NPASH.  The  timing  of  the 
denominator in the ratio was selected to be the end of 1990 in order to  measure 
the peak of exposure. 




Banks'  loan  books  are  disaggregated  into  9  sectors 
according  to  the  classification  used  by  the  Statistics 
Finland  (the  names  in  parenthesis  refer  to  the respective 
asset share variables): 
(1) manufacturing (MANSH) 
(2) construction (CONSH) 
(3) real estate (RESSH) 
(4) retail & wholesale trade (TRASH) 
(5) hotels & restaurants (HORSH) 
(6) other services (SERSH) 
(7)  agriculture and  forestry (AGRSH) 
(8) other firms  (OTHSH) 
(9) households excluding farming households (HOUSH) 
Sectors  (1)-(4)  are  also  aggregated  into  a  wider 
"business"  sector  (BUSSH)  for  reasons  that  become obvious  later.  In the  analysis  we  use shares calculated at 
the end of 1990. 
The  share  of foreign  currency  lending  in  all  lending  is 
also  calculated  at  the  end  of  1990,  and  denoted  by 
FORSH. 
Predicted npa share:  The variable is  computed by  multiplying the  above  asset 
shares with respective aggregate level probabilities, based 
on  the  data  in  the  appendix.  As  even  at  the  aggregate 
level  not exactly  as  fine  split  is  available  as  above,  for 
the  agricultural sector the probability of the households is 
used,  and for hotels and restaurants and other services the 
probability of the "other"  sector.  The predicted npa  share 
is denoted by NP ASHE 
Growth:  As  the  asset  growth  variable  we  use  the  percentage 
change  of total  lending  from  31/12/1986  to  31/12/1990; 
symbol GROWTH. 
Diversification:  Diversification  of  the  loan  portfolio  is  measured  by 
DIV90 = 1 - 2:sT,  where  Si  is  the share of sector i at  the 
end of 1990. DIV90 is  thus 1 - the Herfindahl index, and 
measures the evenness of the sectoral portfolio shares. 
Change of structure:  We  compute  an  analogous  measure  for  the  change  of 
asset  structure  DELTA2 = 2:(sl90) - sl86)i,  where  the 
number in parenthesis refers to the year of observation. 
Size:  Bank size is  measured by  the total  lending outstanding at 
the end  of 1986 (millions of FIM). The variable name is 
SIZE. 
Some basic statistics on  the relevant variables are given in table 1. The average 
share of problem  assets is  9.2 per cent of the 1990 stock of loans, being clearly 
higher  for  the  savings  banks  (13.2)  than  for  the  cooperative  banks  (8.2). 
SimilariIy the growth of lending between 1986 and  1990 was also clearly higher 
(101.5  %) for the savings banks than for the cooperative banks (70.5  %). 
It can  be  seen  that  the  average  savings  and  cooperative  banks  have  lent 
mainly  to  households.  Agriculture  has  also  a  significant  share  in  lending, 
particularly for  the cooperative banks.  Various non-agricultural business sectors 
are  clearly  more  important  for  the  savings  banks  than  the  cooperative  banks. 
For both banks there was  a substantial increase in the share of business  lending 
between 1986 and  1990. 
13 Table 1.  Descriptive statistics on the variables used 
All observations  Average 
.  average  standard  minimum  maximum  savings  cooperative 
deviation  banks  banks 
NPASH  9.2  8.5  0.0  71.6  13.2  8.2 
NPASHE  11.6  1.6  8.5  21.9  12.6  11.3 
GROWTH  77.1  45.3  -25.2  579.2  101.5  70.5 
DIV90  57.1  7.0  25.2  72.3  56.2  57.4 
DELTA2  1.9  2.1  0.0  25.5  2.3  1.8 
SIZE*  197.7  336.2  2.7  3006.9  449.9  129.8 
FORSH  1.3  4.7  0.0  45.5  6.1  0.0 
MANSH  3.5  2.3  0.0  15.1  4.1  3.4 
CONSH  2.8  2.5  0.0  29.8  3.9  2.4 
TRASH  4.5  2.4  0.0  14.4  6.0  4.1 
HORSH  0.7  1.1  0.0  13.4  1.1  0.7 
RESSH  3.0  3.2  0.0  20.6  3.8  2.8 
SERSH  0.8  1.4  0.0  12.9  1.5  0.7 
AGRSH  28.7  15.9  0.1  85.3  18.1  31.6 
OTHSH  4.1  1.9  0.0  11.7  4.7  4.0 
HOUSSH  51.7  12.2  13.7  82.5  56.8  50.4 
BUSSH  13.8  6.5  0.0  49.7  17.8  12.7 
* In millions of markka 
As noted  in  the introduction and evident from  the table in  the appendix,  at  the 
level  of the  banking system  as  a  whole,  lending  to  the  business  sectors  that 
depend  mainly  on  domestic  demand  has  resulted  in  much  higher  shares  of 
problem assets  than  lending to  households. Therefore the asset structure should 
help  in  explaining  the  differences  between  the  problem  asset  shares  of the 
savings  banks  and  the cooperative banks.  However,  the  table  in  the  appendix 
also  indicates  that  in  all  sectors  the  share  of problem  assets  is  substantially 
higher  in  the  savings  bank  group  than  in  the  cooperative or commercial  bank 
group.  That  suggests  strongly  that  asset  structure  is  not  the  only  important 
factor.  Scatter  diagrams  (Figures  2  and  3)  indicate  how  also  in  our data  on 
individual banks high npa shares are associated with both high rates of lending 
growth and high shares of business lending. 
14 Figure 2.  NPASH and GROWTH 
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15 4  The results 
Individual asset shares as explanatory variables 
We  investigate first  the sample  as  a whole  assuming  that the  behaviour is  the 
same for all  of the 85 savings banks and  the 316 cooperative banks of our data 
set.  The  equations  are  estimated  by  OLS.  The  equations  with  all  sectoral 
lending shares except the household share and various bank dependent variables 
as  explanatory variables are reported in  table 2. 
Including only asset shares in the equation indicates that the asset structure 
indeed has  an  important effect on the amount of non-performing assets.  All of 
the shares obtain coefficients with positive signs  indicating thus that lending to 
all  other sectors has  been more risky  than lending to the households,  which is 
the baseline.  However, in  two cases the sectoral  "probababilities" exceed unity. 
That  suggests  that  either  the  model  is  wrong  or the  variables  act  to  a  large 
extent as  proxies which should not be interpreted as  probabilities. 
Adding growth of lending to the equation improves the fit significantly and 
the coefficient obtains the  highest t-value among the explanatory variables.4  At 
the  same time,  the  coeffifients  of the share variables  become smaller and  less 
variable.  In  particular,  the  share of construction  lending gets  now  a  coeffient 
that  does  not differ  any  more  much  from  that  of most  other  share variables. 
Also,  in general the  levels of these coefficients appear reasonable,  although the 
implied probabilities exceed somewhat the  aggregate level shares shown in the 
appendix. 
A  notable  exception  from  this  reasonable  pattern  is  the  share  of other 
services,  SERSH.  The coefficient of this  variable still exceeds unity  indicating 
that it  indeed is mainly a proxy variable or that the model is still misspecified. 
The other bank specific variables  (FORSH,  DIV90,  DELTA2,  and  SIZE) 
do not get significant coefficients when growth is  included, but the signs are as 
expected.s  As  a  whole,  GROWTH and  the  share  of "other"  services  SERSH 
appear as  the strongest explanatory variables. It is  noteworthy that the coeffient 
of MANSH does not differ very much from  those of the other business sectors. 
This suggests that for the savings banks and  the cooperative banks,  the risks  in 
manufacturing  lending  have  been  closer  to  those  in  services  while  for 
commercial  banks  lending  to  manufacturing  has  clearly  been  less  risky.  The 
sample  based  data  in  the  appendix  suggest  a  similar  difference  between  the 
banking  groups,  although not  quite  as  clearly  as  the coefficient estimates.  An 
explanation could be that the manufacturing firms financed by  the savings and 
4  Also constant is  included in equations from number 2 onwards, consistently with the  original 
formulation  of the  problem with  bank speCific  effects.  One  asset share,  that of the  least  risky 
household  sector  is  simultaneously  dropped  from  the  equation.  The  change  in  fit  between 
equation (1) and (2)  in table 2 stems solely from  GROWTH. 
5 This result does not change even if one tries  the sum of absolute deviations instead of the sum 
of squared  deviations  in  constructing  the  diversification  variable  and  the  structural  change 
variable.  Similarily, a logarithmic transformation of the  size variable does  not work any  better. 
Without  growth  the  diversification  variable  gets  a Significant  coefficient  (with negative  sign), 
but the improvement in fit  through its  inclusion remains small. 
16 Table 2.  Equation with individual asset shares; 
all banks, n=401 
(1)  (2)  (3) 
Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff. 
(t-value)  (t-value)  (t-value) 
CONSTANT  -4.6  -1.2 
(-2.40)*  (-.34) 
MANSH  .31  .34  .38 
(2.13)*  (2.43)*  (2.33)* 
CONSH  1.04  .37  .34 
(6.82)**  (2.13)*  (1.69) 
TRASH  .42  .32  .37 
(2.56)*  (1.94)  (1.96) 
HORSH  .29  .16  .14 
(.91)  (0.53)  (.45) 
RESSH  .30  .26  .24 
(2.45)*  (2.15)*  (1.93) 
AGRSH  .01  .06  .06 
(.78)  (1.96)  (1.60) 
SERSH  1.84  1.34  1.24 
(6.75)**  (4.96)**  (4.22)** 
OTHSH  .19  .20  .21 
(1.07)  (1.00)  (.96) 
HOUSH  .01 
-.54 
GROWTH  .074  .064 
(6.80)**  (5.02)** 
FORSH  .11 
(.97) 
DIV90  -.063 
(-.80) 
DELTA2  .18 
(.91) 
SIZECa)  .02 
(.19) 
iF(%)  36.2  42.8  42.6 
BPS  .75  .85  .96 
Ca)  In 100 millions of markka 
* significant at the 5 % level 
*  * significant at the 1 % level 
BPS is the significance level of the Breusch-Pagan test for heteroskedasticity 
17 cooperative banks have mainly been small home-market firms  hit harder by  the 
collapse of domestic demand than other manufacturers. 
The  fit  of the  equations  appears  relatively  high  for  cross-section  data. 
Neither is  there need  to  worry  about heteroskedasticity that often is  a problem 
in  work  with  this  type  of  data;  the  Breusch-Pagan  test  clearly  rejects  the 
hypothesis of heteroskedasticity. 
The "condensed" asset share and the predicted npa share as 
explanatory variables 
Given  that  the  shares  of manufacturing,  construction,  trade,  and  real  estate 
business  obtain  roughly  the  same coefficient values,  we use  the sum of these 
four shares; BUSSH, in some further experiments. 
Table 3 contains  the  results  obtained with either BUSSH or the predicted 
npa share NP  ASHE and different other variables as explanatory variables. 
The results  in table 3 suggest,  first,  that not very much explanatory power 
is  lost when the four  most important share variables are  aggregated.  Secondly, 
the  condensed  business  share  variable  and  the  share  of other  services  plus 
growth  again  are  the  important  explanatory  variables,  while  other  (banks 
specific) variables remain insignificant. 
Replacing the business share variable by the predicted npa share variable in 
the equation does not change much the explanatory power or the coefficients of 
the other variables.  Thus  these  two  variables  appear to  contain  almost exactly 
the same information. 
Two other things  are of particular interest in table 3.  First,  the coefficient 
of the  predicted  npa  share  is  not  significantly  different  from  unity,  the  point 
estimate being particularly close to  unity in the equation containing only growth 
and  SERSH  as  explanatory  variables.  It seems  thus  that  the  aggregate  level 
sectoral probababilities can be used  to  get unbiased estimates of the npa share 
of an  individual  bank,  but  only  if the  effects  of growth  of lending  and  the 
information in the share of "other services" are taken into account. 
Secondly, the share of other services SERSH gets consistently a coefficient 
exceeding  unity.  This  is  puzzling.  The  branch  contains  activities  such  as 
technical and  unspecified services for  businesses. The importance of the whole 
branch on the banks' balance sheets is on average very small (0.9 %,  1.5 % and 
0.7 %  for  the  whole  sample,  the  savings  banks  and  the  cooperative  banks, 
respectively).  One  factor  explaining  the  high  coefficient  value  could  be  that 
lending  to  this  sector  has  been particularly  weakly collateralized,  as  the firms 
probably have lacked collateralizable assets.6 
Nevertheless,  it  is  likely that SERSH is  more carrying information about a 
bank's  portfolio  choices  than  as  such  affecting  the  outcome  in  terms  of bad 
assets. One rather depressing explanation could be that the banks that have been 
singularly  careless  in  lending  decisions  have  also  failed  to  classify  properly 
their lending and have instead often times used this residual service category. 
6  To  the  extent  these  firms  use  tangible  assets  - mainly  premises  - in  their production,  the 
assets may be owned by separate companies, ego real estate firms. 
18 Table 3.  Equation with the condensed asset share or the predicted 
NPA share; all banks, n=401 
(4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff.  Coeff. 
(t-value)  (t-value)  (t-value)  (t-value) 
CONSTANT  -1.79  -1.06  -1.88  -13.1 
(-2.25)*  (-1.35)  (-.59)  (-4.67)** 
BUSSH  .32  .26  .23 
(5.05)**  (4.17)**  (3.23)** 
NPASHE  1.40 
(4.99)** 
GROWTH  .086  .073  .063  .080 
(9.43)**  (7.88)**  (5.42)**  (7.99)** 
SERSH  1.22  1.13 
(4.67)**  (4.01)** 
FORSH  .15 
(1.38) 
DIV90  .027 
(.50) 
DELTA2  .19 
(1.03) 
SIZECa)  .005 
(.05) 
iF(%)  39.9  42.9  43.1  39.8 
Ca)  In 100 millions of markka 
* significant at the 5 % level 
*  * significant at the 1 % level 
(8)  (9) 
Coeff.  Coeff. 
(t-value)  (t-value) 
-9.11  -9.73 
(-3.13)**  (-2.40)* 
1.02  .79 
(3.51)**  (2.50)* 
.073  .066 
(7.31)**  (5.56)** 
1.14  1.04 









42.2  42.5 Firms  classified  in  other  services  (eg.  business  consultancy  firms)  may  also 
have been used  in complex swindling operations. In fact,  as  we shall  see later, 
the  estimated  effect  of SERSH  stems  in  a  large  degree,  although  not  alone, 
from a couple of extreme savings bank observations. Therefore, it should not be 
given too much weight as a general factor. 
Differences between savings banks and cooperative banks? 
In  table  4 we  report  results  obtained  when  allowing  the  coefficients  to  differ 
between the savings banks  and  the cooperative banks.  Only the version with all 
individual  asset  shares  as  explanatory  variables  are  reported,  as  the  estimated 
coefficients  do  not  any  more justify  aggregating the  various  "business  shares" 
into one. The equations with the  predicted npa share as  an explanatory variable 
are  not  reported  either,  as  the  equations  are  not  qualitatively  different  but  fit 
somewhat less  well with the data.  The first column contains  the formal  tests of 
equality of coefficients across the banking groups. The test is  done by  including 
savings bank dummies both for the intercept and  the slope coefficients. 
Several interesting differences exist between the two  banking groups.  First, 
the fit  is  much  better for  the savings banks.  Partially this  may  reflect the much 
smaller number of observations in the savings bank sample. But it  also suggests 
that stochastic elements indeed play  a bigger role  in the case of the cooperative 
banks. A reason could be  that given the smaller average size in  terms  of assets 
and  also  in  terms  of geographical  coverage,  the cooperative banks  may  not be 
able  to  diversify  as  much  as  the  savings  banks.7  Consequently,  idiosyncratic 
risks are of greater importance for the cooperative banks. 
Second,  growth  of bank  lending  is  very  significant  in  both  sub-samples. 
The point estimate of the coefficient of growth for  the savings banks  is  almost 
douple the one obtained for the cooperative banks.  Nevertheless, the difference 
fails to be significant even at the 5 per cent level. 
Third, for the savings banks,  the only other variable obtaining a significant 
coefficient in  addition to  GROWTH is  the perplexing SERSH.  In  contrast,  for 
the cooperative banks, the shares of manufacturing and construction lending and 
bank size obtain significant coefficients  with  expected  signs.  Also  the share of 
foreign  currency  lending  would  get  a  significant  positive  coefficient  for  the 
cooperative banks (equation not reported). However,  that is not very meaningful 
statistically,  as  there  are  only  two  banks  that  have  positive  FORSH  values 
among  the  316 cooperative  banks,  and  one of them  is  an  exceptional  case in 
other respects as well. 
The  unimportance  of  the  share  of  foreign  currency  lending  as  an 
explanatory variable for  the savings banks is  clearly contrary to  a priori beliefs. 
We  return  to  this  issue  after  investigating  the  importance  of outliers  for  the 
results. 
7 It should be remembered that our indicator of diversification is very partial measuring only the 
evenness of sectoral lending shares. 
20 Table 4.  Equations with separate coefficients for the savings 
banks and the cooperative banks 
(10)  (11)  (12) 
All  banks  Savings banks  Cooperative banks 
n=401  n=85  n=316 
Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value 
CONSTANT  1.98  (.49)  -10.9  (-1.31)  1.98  (.52) 
INTERCEPT-DUMMY  -11.5  (-1.48) 
MANSH  .40  (2.09)*  .50  (1.23)  .40  (2.16)* 
MANSH-DUMMY  .09  (.22) 
CONSH  .56  (2.37)*  -.24  (-.42)  .56  (2.46)* 
CONSH-DUMMY  -.82  (-1.51) 
TRASH  .31  (1.42)  .74  (1.57)  .31  (1.47) 
TRASH-DUMMY  .40  (.87) 
HORSH  .30  (.82)  .30  (.41)  .30  (.85) 
HORSH-DUMMY  -.05  ( -.06) 
RESSH  -.02  (-.01)  .49  (1.68)  -.02  (-.14) 
RESSH-DUMMY  .48  (1.66) 
ARGSH  .03  (.79)  .24  (1.78)  .03  (.81) 
ARGSH-DUMMY  .20  (1.61) 
SERSH  .09  (.24)  2.48  (3.96)**  .09  (.25) 
SERSH-DUMMY  2.30  (3.59)** 
OTHSH  .29  (1.27)  .02  (.03)  .29  (1.32) 
OTHSH-DUMMY  -.34  (-.59) 
GROWTH  .054  (3.45)**  .108  (3.38)**  .054  (3.57)** 
GROWTH-DUMMY  .050  (1.63) 
SIZECa)  .54  (2.69)**  -.09  (-.54)  .54  (2.79)** 
SIZE-DUMMY*  -.65  ( -2.70)** 
DIV90  -.09  (-1.03)  -.03  (-.13)  -.09  (-1.06) 
DIV90-DUMMY  .06  (.27) 
DELTA2  .28  (1.21)  -.17  (-.36)  .28  (1.26) 
DELTA2-DUMMY  -.47  (-.98) 
FORSH  -.09  (-.41) 
IF(%)  46.2  68.1  18.2 
Ca)  100 millions of markka 
* significant at the 5 % level 
** significant at the 1 % level 
21 The effect of outliers 
The data contains a couple of relatively extreme observations,  the behaviour of 
which may  primarily be due  to  other factors than  those considered in this study. 
For three savings banks  and  one cooperative bank the share of non-performing 
loans  exceeds  50  per cent.  The three  savings  banks  are  also  among  the  four 
banks with the highest values of the problematic SERSH variable. Two of these 
three banks have the highest rates of growth of the whole sample (over 300 and 
500  per  cent,  respectively).  Furthermore,  the  managements  of all  of the  three 
savings  banks  have  been  sued  for  damages  and  in  two  cases  also  criminal 
processes  are  underway.  The  cooperative  bank  is  the  only  bank  with  the 
NP ASH exceeding 70 per cent. 
In terms of bank size, one cooperative bank is  a clear outlier in  the group; 
its  size is  almost douple that  of the two  second biggest cooperative banks and 
over  20  times  that of the  average  cooperative bank.  The bank was  formed  by 
merging  three  banks  after  the  outset of the  crisis.  Managers  and  members  of 
board have been sued for damages in two of these banks. 
It is  reasonable  to  test  the  robustness  of  the  results  by  excluding  the 
aforementioned 3 savings banks and  2 cooperative banks from  the sample. The 
estimation results for three equations are reported in  table 5. 
In  terms  of fit,  the  exclusion  of the  outliers  makes  the  results  somewhat 
more  similar  between  the  two  banking  groups.  R2  declines  clearly  for  the 
savings banks, suggesting that the earlier good fit was  in part a result of a few 
exceptional observations.  For the cooperative banks the opposite is  true:  the fit 
improves  substantially  when  only  two  observations  are  dropped  from  the 
sample of 316. 
Excluding the  outliers  also  strengthens the conclusions  made on  the  basis 
of  earlier  equations:  growth  of  lending  is  the  most  important  explanatory 
variable  in  the  sample  as  a  whole  and  also  for  the  savings  banks  and  the 
cooperative banks separately. 
In  fact,  for  the  savings  banks,  GROWTH  is  the  only  variable  that  gets 
significant coefficient at the 1 per cent level (at the 5 per cent level also the the 
share of lending to agriculture is  significant). In particular, the coefficient of the 
puzzling  SERSH  variable  ceases  to  be  a  significant.  Its  impact  stems  thus 
almost solely from a few extreme observations. 
The  coefficient  of GROWTH  is  now  significantly  higher  for  the  savings 
banks than for  the cooperative banks  (point estimates  in free  regressions  about 
.12 and .6, respectively). 
If we  use  the  coefficient  value  .12  in  calculating  the  effect  of  the 
differential  between  average  growth  rates  of  the  savings  banks  and  the 
cooperative  banks  respectively,  we  get  the  result  that  3.6  percentage  points  or 
over  70  per cent  of the  difference  between  the  average NP ASH values  of the 
two  banking  groups  stems  from  the  higher  average  lending growth  among  the 
savings banks. 
22 Table 5.  Equations excluding outliers 
(13)  (14)  (15) 
All banks  Savings banks  Cooperative banks 
n=396  n=82  n=314 
Coeff.  t-value  Coeff.  t-value  coeff.  t-value 
CONSTANT  1.42  (0.43)  -9.11  (-1.12)  1.42  (.48) 
INTERCEPT-DUMMY  -7.97  (-1.24) 
MANSH  .55  (3.55)**  .52  (1.32)  .55  (3.94)** 
MANSH-DUMMY  -.05  (-.14) 
CONSH  .60  (3.14)**  .28  (.45)  .60  (3.49)** 
CONSH-DUMMY  -.37  (-.76) 
TRASH  .36  (2.09)*  .75  (1.61)  .37  (2.32)* 
TRASH-DUMMY  .32  (0.84) 
HORSH  .43  (1.40)  .24  (.33)  .42  (1.55) 
HORSH-DUMMY  -.28  (-.47) 
RESSH  -.03  (-.22)  .47  (1.60)  -.03  (-.25) 
RESSH-DUMMY  .42  (1.74) 
AGRSH  .04  (1.20)  .27  (2.02)*  .04  (1.33) 
ARGSH-DUMMY  .21  (2.07)* 
SERSH  -.02  (-.06)  1.16  (1.41)  -.02  (-.07) 
SERSH-DUMMY  .11  (1.67) 
OTHSH  .24  (1.26)  .16  (.27)  .24  (1.40) 
OTHSH-DUMMY  -.20  (-.42) 
GROWTH  .059  (4.66)**  .127  (4.00)**  .060  (5.17)** 
GROWTH-DUMMY  .059  (2.32)* 
SIZECa)  .17  (0.94)  -.0029  (-.02)  .18  (1.04) 
SIZE-DUMMY*  -.23  (-1.07) 
DIV90  -.10  (-1.38)  -.13  (-.57)  -.10  (-1.53) 
DIV90-DUMMY  -.04  (-.21) 
DELTAZ  .24  (1.28)  .18  (.30)  .24  (1.42) 
DELTAZ-DUMMY  -.06  (-.12) 
FORSH  -.18  (-.79) 
R2(%)  39.0  45.9  25.2 
Ca)  100 millions of markka 
* significant at the 5 % level 
*  * significant at the 1 % level 
23 Excluding the two  outliers from  the cooperative bank sample increases the 
coefficients  of  three  business  sector  lending  shares  (MANSH,  CONSH  and 
TRASH)  and  turn  them  (even  more)  significant.  Interestingly  also,  the 
diversification  and  change-of-structure variables  continue  to  obtain coefficients 
with  the  expected  signs,  although  they  still  remain  insignificant.  The  SIZE 
variable,  on the  other hand,  loses significance when in  fact just one outlier is 
excluded. So it seems that the direct effect of bank size on asset quality is  not 
generally  very  strong.  That  does  not  mean,  though,  that  the  indirect  effects 
through growth and asset structure of the factors  that are likely to be associated 
with bank size were unimportant. 
The role of foreign currency loans 
There  is  strong  anecdotal  evidence  that  many  bankruptcies  were  triggered  by 
the  increased  debt  service  burden  of  the  loans  denominated  in  foreign 
currencies due to the depreciation the markka 1991 through 1993. It is  therefore 
surprising that we do  not detect the impact of the share of these loans on banks' 
asset quality in our data. 
One  explanation  could  be  the  fact  - noted  in  section  3  - that  non-
performing assets  related  to  guarantee obligations  are  not covered  by  the data. 
However, the importance of this factor is very difficult to assess. 
Another  obvious  explanation  relates  to  the  fact  that  the  share  of foreign 
currency  loans  is  highly  correlated  with growth.  The correlation  coefficient is 
.82 and  .66 for  all  savings  banks  and  the savings  banks with  positive  FORSH 
values,  respectively;  see  also  Diagram  4.  Thus  precisely  those  banks  that 
increased  lending rapidly  also supplied a high fraction  of their loans  in foreign 
currencies. As a consequence,  it is difficult to  distinguish between the effects of 
these  two  factors  with  our  data.  Nevertheless,  statistically  growth  is  a  better 
sole explanatory variable than than the share of foreign currency loans.8 
More  insight  into  the  issue  may  be  gained  by  looking  separately  at  the 
savings  banks with foreign  currency  loans  (42  banks in  all)  and  those without 
such loans  (43).  In particular,  if GROWTH captures partially also the effect of 
FORSH  in  the  sample  of  all  savings  banks,  one  would  expect  that  the 
coefficient of GROWTH were  larger  in  the  sample of the  banks  with foreign 
currency  loans  than  in  the  sample  of the  banks  without  such  loans  in  an 
equation where FORSH is  excluded  as  an  explanatory variable.  Four separate 
regressions are reported  in  table 6 and various sample means of some variables 
are listed in table 7. 
8  Including constant and only  GROWTH or FORSH as an explanatory variable  in the  savings 
bank equation gives R2-values of 56 and 49 per cent, respectively. 
24 Figure 4.  GROWTH and FORSH, Savings banks 




400  •  ~  0 
I 
~ 300  -
0  •  a: 
(!)  •  200  •  •  •  •  ,. 
I~  •  100  .. . :,,- .. 
0 
0  10  20  30  40  50 
FORSH,% 
Surprisingly, the point estimate of the coefficient of GROWTH is smaller in the 
sample  of  the  banks  with  foreign  currency  loans,  and  statistically  the 
coefficients  cannot  be  said  to  differ.9  In any  case,  the  idea  that  GROWTH 
would partially stand as  a proxy for FORSH is  not supported by  these separate 
regressions. 
Importantly  GROWTH  continues  to  obtain  the  highest  t-value  in  all 
equations  except  in  the  equation  for  all  banks  with  foreign  currency  loans, 
where no single variable is significantly different from  zero. 
Including FORSH in  the sample of the banks with  positive FORSH values 
(the  last  equation  in  table  6),  results  in  FORSH  getting  a  relatively  large 
negative coefficient (the significance level 5.9 per cent). Thus  among the banks 
with foreign  currency loans,  the higher the share of such loans,  the  less,  ceteris 
paribus,  problem  assets.  That  this  may  not just be  a statistical  artifact  due  to 
multicollinearity  is  suggested by  the observations that the inclusion of FORSH 
improves  the  fit  substantially,  and  makes  the  coefficients  of other  variables 
obtain  the  expected  signs  with  larger  although  still  insignificant  t-values.  An 
economic  explanation  for  the  negative  coefficient  might  be  that  banks  with 
positive FORSR values  also gave" guarantees to  foreign currency loans, and  that 
a low positive FORSH value is  associated with large amounts of guarantees. 
9  A t-test about the equality of the  GROWTH coefficients while restricting all  other coefficients 
to  be  the  same  across  the  two  sub-samples  clearly  rejects  the  hypotesis  that  the  coefficients 
would be different  (Significant  levels  .56  and  .86  with and without outliers in the  sample with 
foreign currency loans, respectively). 
25 Table 6.  Equations  separately  for  the  savings  banks  with  and 
without foreign currency loans 
(16)  (17)  (18)  (19) 
Banks with  All banks with  Non-outlier banks  Non-outlier banks 
FORSH = 0  FORSH> 0  with FORSH > 0  with FORSH > 0 
n = 43  n= 42  n = 39  n = 39 
CONSTANT  -5.24  -26.4  -20.4  -16.9 
t-value  (-.52)  (-.93)  (-.79)  (-.69) 
MANSH  .50  -.12  -.44  .97 
t-value  (1.07)  (-.07)  (-.29)  (.60) 
CONSH  -.27  -.72  .03  1.97 
t-value  (-.37)  (-.43)  (.02)  (1.02) 
TRASH  .33  1.30  -.34  1.38 
t-value  (.50)  (.86)  (-.22)  (.80) 
HORSH  -.61  -.47  -1.38  1.08 
t-value  (.54)  (-.22)  (-.67)  (.47) 
RESSH  .99  040  -.24  .43 
t-value  (1.60)  (.85)  (-.50)  (.76) 
AGRSH  .18  .13  -.40  .97 
t-value  (1.25)  (.10)  (-.33)  (.71) 
SERSH  3.36  2.41  -.64  1.12 
t-value  (2.16)*  (1.62)  (-.35)  (.57) 
OTHSH  -.60  1.98  .80  2.61 
t-value  (-.79)  (1.15)  (.48)  (1.43) 
GROWTH  .127  .071  .098  .156 
t-value  (3.27)**  (1.31)  (2.03)  (2.87)** 
SIZE  -3.43  .14  .20  .29 
t-value  (-1.86)  (.64)  (1.04)  (1.55) 
DIV90  -.00  .15  .48  -.63 
t-value  (-.01)  (.11)  (.38)  (-.47) 
DELTA  -.28  .36  2.88  1.58 
t-value  (-.33)  (.27)  (1.65)  (.88) 
FORSH  -.84 
t-value  (-1.98) 
iP(%)  40.1  72.5  49.2  54.4 
* significant at the 5 % level 
**  significant at the 1 % level 
26 Table 7.  Sample means of selected variables 
SAMPLE 
All savings  Non-outlier  Savings  Non-outlier 
banks with  savings  banks with  cooperative 
PORSH> 0  banks with  PORSH =  0  banks with 
n =  42  PORSH> 0  n =  43  PORSH =  0 
n =  39  n =  313 
NPASH*  18.0  15.0  8.4  7.8 
GROWTII*  136.6  117.6  67.2  70.3 
BUSSH*  22.7  21.2  13.0  12.6 
PORSH*  12.4  10.5  0.0  0.0 
SIZE**  819.1  848.6  89.3  117.5 
* per cent 
** millions of markka 
A look at the sample means  in table 7 reveals that supplying loans denominated 
in foreign currency was typical for the savings banks that not only grew rapidly 
but also were big, supplied disproportionally loans to risky business sectors, and 
ended  up  with  an  average  share  non-performing  asset  that  is  douple  that  of 
other  savings  banks.1O  Interestingly,  the  savings  banks  without  foreign 
currency  loans  do  not  differ  much  from  their  cooperative  counterparts  with 
respect to growth, share of business loans, or size. 
It is  impossible to  fully  disentangle the effects of growth and  the share of 
foreign  currency  loans  on  the  basis  of our  data.  As  a  whole,  our  findings 
nevertheless  lend  support  to  the  view  that  growth  is  more  fundamental  and  a 
positive and  furthermore a high share of foreign currency loans was a feature of 
the  rapidly  growing savings  banks  that  perhaps  added  to  banks'  asset  quality 
problems but was not a strong independent factor. 
It should  also  be  noted  that  the  foreign  currency  loans  supplied  by  the 
savings banks and  the cooperative banks amounted to FIM lOA billion in all  at 
the end of 1990. That is  about one fourth of all  problem assets  in  these banks 
implying  that  even  a  strongly  above-average  proportion  of  problem  assets 
among these  loans  could not be decisive for  the  outcome as  a whole for  these 
banks. However, even though the local banks on average may not have suffered 
too  much  from  the  depreciation  of the  markka,  for  the  three  outlier  savings 
banks  the  high  foreign  currency  shares  (over  30  per  cent  of lending)  were  a 
significant factor.  Also the  commercial  banks  that intermediated the bulk of all 
foreign currency  loans  (about FIM 100 billion) had  very  likely many  customer 
10  Incidentally,  36 of the  banks  with foreign  currency loans  were  among the  43  banks  that in 
1992 formed the ill-fated Savings Bank of Finland. 
27 whose debt service burden was fatally  increased through the depreciation of the 
markkaY 
5  Conclusions 
The  empirical  results  obtained  with  data  on  individual  savings  banks  and 
cooperative  banks  suggest unambiguously  that  the  banks'  lending structures  at 
the outset of the banking crisis cannot alone explain why different banks ended 
up with different amounts of problem loans later in the crisis. 
Instead,  the results  indicate  that growth of lending  in  the  late  1980s  is  a 
major determinant of the later non-performing assets: the faster credit expansion 
in 1986-1990, the more problem assets in 1993. 
This  basic  result  is  very  robust  to  small  changes  in  the  model.  It 
furthermore  holds  both  for  the  savings  banks  and  for  the  cooperative  banks, 
although the effect is stronger for the savings banks. 
In fact, for the savings banks, growth seems to  be the only important factor 
explaining  bank  level  variation  in  the  share  of  non-performing  loans.  For 
cooperative  banks  also  the  share  of  business  lending  (particularly  to 
manufacturing,  construction  and  trade)  has  contributed  significantly  to  high 
shares of problem assets. Nevertheless, in the case of cooperative banks a much 
smaller  fraction  of the  bank  level  variation  can  be  explained  by  growth  and 
asset structure than in the case of the savings banks by growth alone. 
A  somewhat  surprising  observation  is  that  the  share  of foreign  currency 
loans does not explain much if anything of the variation in the share of problem 
assets,  when the effect of growth is  accounted for.  As growth and  the share of 
foreign  currency  loans  are  highly  correlated,  the  effects  cannot  be  fully 
separated  in our data,  and  strong conclusions are not warranted  in  this  regard. 
Supplying foreign  currency  loans was  a feature of rapidly growing and usually 
big savings  banks.  These loans  added  greatly  to  the  asset  quality  problems of 
some  big  savings  banks  but  were  not  a  generally  important  factor  explaining 
why banks ended up with different amounts of problem assets. 
The  results  suggest  that  perhaps  as  much  as  70  per  cent  of the  some  5 
percentage point difference  in  the  share of non-performing  assets  between  the 
two  banking groups  can be  explained directly  by  higher lending growth  in  the 
savings  bank  group  during  the  boom  years.  Put  differently,  had  the  savings 
banks  on  average  been  as  "conservative"  in  lending  as  their  cooperative 
counterparts,  the  average  share  of  non-performing  assets  might  have  been 
slightly  over  9  per  cent  instead  of 13.  Such  a  difference  had  probably  been 
sufficient to  keep  a substantial number of the savings banks that later ceased to 
exist from  loosing their capital. It is  noteworthy that the smaller savings banks, 
which  in  general  have  fared  relatively  well,  resemble  very  much  the  average 
cooperative banks with regard to  both asset structure and growth of lending. 
Our  findings  are  consistent  with  and  complement  the  results  of Murto 
(1994)  about  the  pricing  of loans  by  the  Finnish  savings  banks  in  the  late 
11  This  conclusion  is  particularly  relevant for  the  central  bank of the  saving banks  Skopbank. 
However, in the case of some other commercial banks, the customers may have been rather well 
hedged, as  they operate mainly in the open sector. 
28 1980s. He found  that not  only  did  the savings banks  grossly  underprice  credit 
risk  but  that  they  also  failed  to  take  into  account  all  useful  information  about 
their loan customers contained in the banks' data files. 
On  the assumption that lending growth was  more under the banks' control 
than  lending  structure;  which  we  find  plausible,  both  our  and  Murto's  results 
support  the  view  that  "bad  luck"  alone  does  not  explain  the  fortunes  of 
individual  banks  in  the  Finnish  banking  crisis.  At  least  most  of the  savings 
banks but probably also  many  other banks either neglected the essentially risky 
nature  of lending  or  deliberately  assumed  high  risks  in  their  quest  for  rapid 
growth. Further empirical work is  called for to explore these hypotheses.12 
12  An  interesting  question  is  particularly  the  role  of bank  capital  and  capital  regulations  as 
constraints or facilitating factors  of lending growth. A preliminary look at the data suggests for 
example that the increase in bank capital through value adjustments of fixed property (requiring 
an authorization by banking supervision) correlates very strongly with lending growth. 
29 Appendix 
Banks' credit risk exposure, non-performing assets, and credit losses 1993, billions of markka 
Commercial banksl  Savings banks2  Cooperative banks2 
Gross  Gross  The share  Gross  Gross  The share  Gross 
exposure  NPA's  of NPA's  exposure  NPA's  of NPA's  exposure 
%  % 
Total  402.82  50.93  12.6  88.44  26.59  30.0  100.25 
Firms  197.75  29.97  15.2  37.89  19.95  52.6  32.46 
Manufacturing  73.35  4.12  5.6  6.17  2.31  37.4  4.84 
Construction  19.57  6.13  31.3  4.93  3.50  71.0  4.54 
Trade  40.28  7.59  18.8  8.28  4.15  50.1  7.41 
Real estate  23.25  5.45  22.6  10.28  5.76  56.0  7.92 
Other  41.10  6.68  16.3  8.33  4.23  50.8  7.76 
Households3  78.16  6.35  8.1  45.58  4.86  10.7  63.47 
Other4  127.03  14.61  11.5  4.97  1.78  35.8  4.20 
Gross exposure = exposure (on and off balance sheet) at the end of 1993 plus credit losses  in  1992 and 1993 
Gross NPA's = non-performing assets at the end of 1993 plus credit losses in 1992 and 1993 
1  Bank groups i.e. including daugther credit institutions, and Skopbank and Okobank. 
2  Parent companies only, based on a sample 
3 Including farming households 
4  Mainly foreign clients 
Gross  The share 
NPA's  of NPA's 
% 
14.24  14.2 
9.06  27.9 
0.91  18.8 
1.57  34.6 
2.36  31.8 
2.77  35.0 
1.46  18.8 
4.68  7.4 
0.50  11.9 
All banks 
Gross  Gross  The share 
exposure  NPA's  of NPA's 
% 
591.51  91.76  15.5 
268.10  58.97  22.0 
84.36  7.33  8.7 
29.04  11.20  38.6 
55.96  14.10  25.2 
41.45  13.98  33.7 
57.19  12.37  21.6 
187.21  15.89  8.5 
136.20  16.89  12.4 References 
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